Turkish Gendarmerie leaked documents: Al-Nusra, not Assad behind Reyhanli bombing

Redhack: Turkish Intelligence Services was aware of [the] bombs [that] exploded in Reyhanli

Gendarmerie (Rural Police) Intelligence Department documents obtained by Redhack reveals that Turkish State knew about the vehicles packed with explosives that was detonated in Reyhanli/Hatay, which resulted in 51 deaths (unofficial reports confirm more than 100 dead).

Documents outline the vehicle details including plate numbers of three cars and that they were prepared by Al-Qaeda affiliated Al-Nusra Front in Syria on 23rd April 2013. It also gives information about Turkey registered vehicles packed with explosives, small and delicate devices that was send to Syria from Turkey. 

We now know why the government censored the media reporting on the explosions took place on 11th May 2013. The documents indicate that the explosion was expected and known in advance. However it was disregarded. Subsequently after the explosion the blame is systematically targeted to be directed at the Alewites[Alawites] and left- wing organisations with malicious efforts to collapse the Syrian state.  ... Although the authorities and the Military received intelligence that an explosion was plotted in Reyhanli they failed to act to prevent this attack.

...

Did PM Erdogan knew it was planted by Al-Nusra before he met Obama to plan a possible war with Syria? 

...

Original documents marked as “Classified” and translations;

...

1. Kahraman Maras and Hatay Gendarmerie were provided with intelligence on 17.05.2013 that supplies were to be delivered via a vehicle with the registration of 63 E 3436 to Syria to support a group recognised as Al-Qaida militants. It was known that this group was in preparation to construct explosives. Detailed information in connection to the preparation of explosives was informed specifically detailed in documents received.

2. Technical/sensitive sources investigation: A Lancer make dark colour vehicle loaded with bombs, registration 022 506 (believed to be Syrian registration plate) and KIA Rio make, registration: 667512 (Damascus) Silver colour vehicle: These two vehicles and a black Saab, of which the registration is unknown but believed to be a Damascus registered vehicle, were informed to be loaded with bombs, and on standby in the town of Idlip Syria. Further across the Turkish border intelligence was received,that a vehicle was known to be loaded with explosives , small and sensitive devices. Gendarmeries have been informed that Syrian security forces were searching for those vehicles. Intelligence received has suggested that the vehicles at question were in preparations of an attack targeting Syria. On 25.04.2013 intelligence was again received specifying that, in the town of Rakka, Syria, active militants of El Nusra were known to load and assemble bombs in three vehicles on 23.04.2013. Vehicles were identified as a Mazda 323, Kia Rio and the third was unidentified. These vehicles were prepared to be part of an attack in our country.

...

The bombings at question are believed to be in parallel connection with these identified vehicles. In analysing the intelligence and information received it is known that the explosions have been ongoing in our borders and is known to effect our country. 

In a follow up Redhack posted that the gendarmerie officer who allegedly leaked those documents to them has been taken into custody, giving official credence to these leaked materials. Of course he was arrested since leaking those documents showing that the AKP's terrorist Al-qaeda ally, Al Nusra, was the likely culprit according to their own intelligence services undermines the Neo-Ottoman ambitions to set up a quisling fundamentalist Sunni state in Syria with the aid of such terrorists against Assad who is publicly blamed for the blast by the fascist-Islamic tribe ruling in Ankara.

In a past post on this blog, Orhan Kemal Cengiz, pointed out after the revelation of the Turkish state's involvement in Greek forest fires, that the Turkish state was a "bandit state":
Turkey, the bandit state

AKP: Take Turkish children back from gavurs and gays

The Islamic, chauvinist AKP Regime has began a campaign to retrieve Turkish colonist children in Europe from gavur(infidel) foster couples, starting with gay couples. They are particularly focusing on the case of 9 year old Yunus taken from the Azeroğlu family in the Netherlands after claims of abuse by his family. Ayhan Sefer Üstün, head of the Turkish Parliament’s Human Rights Commission, which was instructed to conduct research on the matter stated: "the child has been given to a foreign culture, to a lesbian family. Even if a child is taken from the family for the right reasons, he or she should be placed with a family closer to his or her culture.”[1]

Furthering, this line of Islamic bigotry, Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdağ has stated that Turkey was waging a massive campaign, and mobilizing diplomatic effort for the 4,000 Turkish children in Europe given to Christian families. He said that European authorities do not respect either the sensitivities or values held by Turks and stated: "Turkish families do not want to give their children to gay and lesbian couples."[2] However, Aygul Özkan, Germany’s first female minister of Turkish origin, currently a minister for social affairs in Saxony since 2010 commented: “There are no Turkish foster families in Germany, and therefore the children of poor Turkish families who cannot afford to raise their children are adopted by families of other nationalities. There should be Turkish foster families instead of German ones."[3]

Thus the issue cannot be that Europeans infidels and sometimes gay ones are adopting Turkish colonist children, that apparently local Turks won't adopt anyway. The issue has to with Turkish identity: Islam and the concept of Turkishness. According to article 301 of the Turkish penal code: 

1. Public denigration of Turkishness, the Republic or the Grand National Assembly of Turkey shall be punishable by imprisonment of between six months and three years.

...

3. In cases where denigration of Turkishness is committed by a Turkish citizen in another country the punishment shall be increased by one third.[4]

If you notice to keep the Turkish-Islamic identity or Turkishness intact for Turks abroad, it merits a greater judicial threat, since they cannot enjoy the oppressive Turkish bandit state threatening them daily! One Turkish, Gulenist religious authority is very unequivocal:

According to Imam al-Ghazzali, Islam’s legal principles seek to protect and secure five basic values in human life, namely, religion, life, intellect, personal property, and reproduction, and forbid acts that will nullify them. When we consider the Divinely established prohibitions (e.g., unbelief, hypocrisy, associating partners with God, apostasy, killing a person, taking intoxicants and drugs, usurpation, theft, adultery, fornication, and homosexuality), we can deduce that they have been given to protect and secure those values. ... 

Sexual Perversion: A Major Sin. Islam, while regulating one’s sexual drive, has prohibited illicit sexual relations and all ways that lead to them, as well as homosexuality. Homosexuality is considered a reversal of the natural order, a corruption of male sexuality, and a violation of the rights of women. The spread of this unnatural practice disrupts a society’s natural life. It also makes those who practice it slaves to their lusts, thereby depriving them of decent taste, decent morals, and a decent manner of living. The Qur’anic account of Prophet Lut’s (Lot) people should be sufficient for us.[5]

At issue is that the AKP regime feels sacred values that uphold Turkish identity are being violated. One of the few Turkish colonists in Europe who actually fostered children, Nejla Buran, sums up the concern: “I think [children] are way happier if they are placed in Turkish families, who speak their language, cook meals like their mother does.”[6] This whole fiasco is because in the bigoted Turkish mind, the issue is not over who is a better parent than the abusive Turkish families, but who is a more Turkish parent. According to a poll by the Reputation Institute, Turks have the biggest gap between their self reported, self-image and their global score(what other parties think of their nation).[7]  Within their own sociology Turks associate Turkishness with goodness. A famous slogan of their eternal, fascist leader, Ataturk, that is oft repeated goes: "A Turk is equal to all the world."[8] 

The real loser in all this is likely Yunus. His lesbian foster family has gone into hiding over this row.[9] Do all the bigoted Turks in the AKP and their fans actually think the presence of Turkishness is more important than being free of abuse? Do they really believe that the anti-gay sentiments of illiberal Islam dating from the 7th Century AD are more apt than the investigations and determinations of the Dutch child social services? 

[1.] Hurriyet: Turkey attempts to retrieve child from foreign gay couple. February 18, 2013.
[2.] Zaman: Turkey working to bring Turkish children out of European foster care. February 18, 2013.
[3.] Zaman: German minister: Number of Turkish foster families should increase in Germany. February 26, 2013
[4.] Amnesty International: Turkey: Article 301: How the law on “denigrating Turkishness” is an
insult to free expression(PDF). p. 1. 

[5.] Büyükçelebi, İsmail. trans. Ali Ünal. Living In The Shade of Islam. (Fountain, 2003) p. 270, 272. (Which is digitized online here.)

[6.] Russiatoday: Turkey wants Turk-born kids brought up in native culture. February 27, 2013.

[7.] CNN Travel: Which country has the best reputation? Sept. 21, 2012. 

[8.] Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Culture: Ataturk Declares. 

[9.] Dutchnews: Lesbian couple go into hiding with Turkish foster child. March 15, 2013.

Turkish lies: massacre on Cyprus in the 50's, no 60's

According to the current official Turkish narrative, the Cyprus conflict was started during the 1960's by the belligerence of Greek Cypriots. A summation of their current position(from their official website):

Turkish Republic of Cyprus: Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

- Contrary to common deception, the Cyprus problem did not start in 1974, but in December 1963, following the destruction of the 1960 Partnership Republic of Cyprus by the Greek Cypriot partner through force of arms. ...

- Between 1963 and 1974, Turkish Cypriots outlived the agonies and losses of the Greek Cypriot armed attacks, were confined to small enclaves ... In fact, the inhuman living conditions forced upon the Turkish Cypriot population were described as a “veritable siege” by the Secretary-General in his report of 10 September 1964 (S/5950) to the Security Council. 

However, Fazıl Küçük, a Turkish Cypriot politician and journalist at the time who would go on to become the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus, actually made the initial claim in 1955 that the Greeks of Cyprus would massacre Turks in Cyprus on August 28th of that year. So contrary to the deceptions of the Turkish narrative, the Turkish Cypriot side started the conflict and drew the first blood against Greeks, when one of the foremost leaders of their community created the pretext for the pogrom against the Greeks(and other gavur) of Istanbul. One can take that they like to conveniently forget that they initially made the claim of attacks and massacres against Turkish Cypriots a whole decade earlier as an admission of their sloppy lies. Here the eminent Greek-American historian, Speros Vryonis, belies their claims of virgin and innocent Turkish Cypriots:

The organization, legal incorporation, and sub rosa encouragement by Menderes and his colleagues of the Kıbrıs Türktür Cemiyeti[Cyprus is Turkish Association] in late August to early September of 1954 is rightly considered by many to mark a significant institutionalization of anti-Greek activities by the Turkish government and the second phase of the formation and mobilization of public opinion on Cyprus. It is at this point that the ktc becomes a new factor in Turkish politics. At the concluding session of the organizations first general meeting, the governing board proceeded to an open and systematic confrontation with Istanbul's Greek minority. The members of the new society invited Alexandros Chatzopoulos to join its governing council. It demanded that the patriarch admonish all Orthodox hierarchs to refrain from involvement in the politics of Cyprus. It further demanded that all the organizations of the Greek community in Istanbul issue printed statements that they took the side of Turkey in the Cyprus issue.[137] With these demands, the government, through the ktc, began to tighten the two separate jaws of a political and ethnic vise that now increasingly threatened to crush the Greek minority. On the one hand was the political friction between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, while, on the other, was the tradition of hatred, suspicion, and jealousy that many Turks—and many members of the Turkish government—inherited and harbored in their respective political outlooks.

Many of these attitudes were in evidence in the formal manifesto issued on October 17, 1954, at the annual meeting of the Organization for the Welfare of the Refugees from Western Thrace: "Since the Turks of Western [i.e., Greek] Thrace have remained as non-exchangeables [in Western Thrace] by virtue of the Treaty of Lausanne, as counterparts of the Greeks of Istanbul, they must be found to be in the same situation from every point of view [stress added] as the Greeks of Istanbul. This being the case, it is obligatory that equality shall be secured, and that the Turks of Western Thrace be raised to the level of the Greeks of Istanbul, or that the Greeks of Istanbul come down to the level of the Turks of Western Thrace."[138] The organizations statement, including the explicit threat to bring "the Greeks of Istanbul... down to the level of the Turks of Western Thrace," was repeated and expanded by the Turkish press. The latter insisted that though the Greeks of Istanbul had been allowed to prosper so that they remained in the city, the Turks of Western Thrace had become so poor that they had to abandon the region and come to Turkey. Thus, the Turkish press was led to a different conclusion from that in the statement above, namely, that the Greeks should be removed from Istanbul. Unfortunately, both the Organization for the Welfare of the Refugees from Western Thrace and the Turkish press had very selective memories. They chose to ignore the three decades of incessant and growing discrimination against Istanbul's Greek community, which had been restricted in the trades and professions it could exercise—indeed, had been financially destroyed through the wartime measures that had plundered Greek businesses, estates, and wealth—and had its men conscripted into the harsh labor battalions of Asia Minor, in which many perished.'

On August 30, 1954, the day of national celebration of the decisive victory of the Turkish over the Greek forces in Asia Minor in 1922, the National Federation of Turkish Students attacked the Greek stores of Istanbul that had failed to place Turkish flags outside their shops. After an oral admonition of displeasure with these actions, the vali of Istanbul let the matter pass, however.[139] In the event, despite the ups and downs in the continuing struggle between Britain and Greece in the United Nations over Cypriot self-determination, the intensity of demonstrations by students and regional organizations, and the stridency of the Turkish press, continued to increase. Throughout the winter of 1954-1955, this unrelenting pressure raised the temperature of Turkish internal political life and, in so doing, reduced the Greek minority of Istanbul to frightful despair.[140] From June 30, 1955, when Great Britain invited Greece and Turkey to a conference in London to propose its own settlement of the Cyprus issue, to the time that Turkey and Greece accepted the invitation (July 2 and 8, respectively), the Turkish press and various Turkish organizations pulled out all the stops in a frenetic effort to rouse Turkish popular feelings and therefore complete the general task that they had set for themselves since the latter half of 1954. The appointment of a new foreign minister, Zorlu, who had very different views from his predecessor regarding Cyprus, fit in with the general turn of events.

Indeed, Zorlu was crucial in the further evolution of the events that led to the London conference, to its failure, and to the pogroms timing. After his appointment, on July 27, 1955, as acting foreign minister and Turkey's representative to the London conference, he established a small committee of experts to study the Cyprus problem. The committee included Nuri Birgi (general secretary of the ministry of foreign affairs), who composed Turkey's White Book on Cyprus; Rüştü Erdelhun (second-in-command of the Turkish general staff); Settar İksel (Turkish ambassador to Athens); Orhan Eralp (general director of the ministry of foreign affairs); and Mahmut Dikerdem.[141]

Meanwhile, the press stepped up the frequency and intensity of its attacks on the Greek community, and the various organizations intensified their political activity in the same general direction.[142] In June, Türk Sesi, a newspaper in which the government often aired its views, proposed amending the treaty of Lausanne (1923) so that the Greek etablis in Istanbul, whose status was regulated by the treaty, could be expelled from Turkey.[143] In general, the subject of removing the patriarchate from Turkey, and a broad attack on the institution, had already become a set piece for the better part of a year and now began to appear in profusion.

This was to continue into August 1955, as the tripartite conference loomed on the horizon. With Zorlu's appointment, a new and more aggressive leadership infused Turkish policies toward Cyprus, Greece, and Great Britain with a vigorous and efficacious spirit.[144] In this penultimate and intense stage of "manufacturing consent," the government, acting discreetly through the student and regional organizations, fully applied the tactics of disseminating false news and manufacturing rumors so as to raise to the level of hysteria the pitch of public fervor and anger against Istanbul's Greek minority.[145]

A critical factor in this campaign of disinformation was the generation and diffusion of the false rumor, essentially manufactured by Fazıl Küçük, that the Greek Cypriots planned to massacre the Turkish Cypriots on August 28, 1955. Given the transformation of the Greeks of Istanbul into a helpless and hostage community, the rumor of a purported Greek plan (in fact, false) to massacre the Turkish minority of Cyprus required no daring conceptual leap on the part of belligerent Turks to consider the Greeks of their (mutual) city as future targets to be destroyed. Early on in its genesis, this rumor was exploited by Hikmet Bil, who issued a secret circular to the ktc's branch offices on August 16. Here, one can do no better than to quote from the transcript of the court-martial proceedings in February 1956 against him and other members of the society:

While Kamil Onal was making these trips and confusing opinion by boastings ignominious to his own country, Hikmet Bil took upon himself to send an urgent and secret circular directive to the organizations. In this circular, dated August 16, 1955, Hikmet Bil refers to a letter dated August 13, 1955, sent by the Cyprus is Turkish Party President General [sic] Dr. Fazıl Küçük to the central headquarters [of the society] in which the latter said that particularly recently the Island [i.e., Cypriot] Greeks had become intolerable and unfortunately the situation is becoming worse. If one can believe the news being spread around Nicosia, they [the Greek Cypriots] are getting ready for a general massacre [of the Turkish Cypriots] in the near future.

Dr. Fazıl Küçük added the following sentence in this letter:

My request of you is that as soon as possible you inform all branches of this situation and that we get them to take action. It seems to me that meetings in the mother country would be very useful. Because these [Cypriot Greeks] will hold a general meeting August 28. Either on that day or after conclusion of the Tripartite Conference they will want to attack us. As is known, they are armed and we have nothing.

Bil added his own order to the society's many branches, attaching it to the end of Küçük's message: "As might be suitable, with whatever additional observations that the headquarters wishes to make, please notify all organizations that our branches should choose whatever action they see fit, particularly with the view that London and Athens should be intimidated by the manly voices arising in the mother country."[146] It is of no little interest to observe at this point the enormity of the transmogrification of Küçük's letter at Bil's hands, his transformation of a general fear of an "attack" on Turkish Cypriots into a specific plan, and finally the carte blanche to respond given to the ktc's branches, without prior approval of the society's governing board but undoubtedly with covert approval from on high (as we shall see later). One of the military tribunals set up by General Aknoz that later charged Bil accused him of incitement to violence, as argued below by Major General Namık Arguç:

This circular that gives the branches a complete freedom in the matter of actions to be taken in the mother country as a counter to the activity of the Greeks who had announced they were preparing for a massacre will go down in our political history as a masterpiece of presumption on the part of the Cyprus Is Turkish Society President General who took upon himself the defense of the Cyprus problem. Whereas in a matter this important it would not be a question for the central executive committee or even a congress, nor a general assembly. First the line the government would follow in such a case should be established to the last detail and then a circular might be sent to branches. Noting good intentions and common sense of the executive committee of the branches, it was necessary that the President take into consideration that they could fall into error or that each branch would consider the question from a different angle and that therefore a complication would arise. Later, during the explanation of the roles played by the Kadıköy and Sarıyer branch presidents Serafim Sağlamel and Osman Tan, it will become clear how this very urgent and secret circular was understood and particularly how the directive regarding the "intimidation from the manly voice" was applied.

Bil was charged—along with other members of the ktc, and with officials and members of dp branch offices—with a variety of offenses, including the ktc circular, burning Greek newspapers, and drafting a ktc statement on the day of the pogrom. His colleague, Kamil Önal, was accused of making various statements to the press, burning Greek newspapers, a demonstration in Taksim, and destroying evidence.[147] (It should be added, in regard to these military tribunals functioning under the martial-law regime legislated on September 12, 1955, that they were clearly kangaroo courts. Hikmet Bil and his co-defendants were used as scapegoats by Menderes to deflect guilt from himself and his government. Still, the ktc did commit the acts of violence during the pogrom of which its leaders were accused. While Menderes bore the moral responsibility for the crime, his confederates were the actual perpetrators.)

Bil's secret circular to the ktc's branches helped considerably to inflame Turkish public opinion, but also to provoke acts of violence against the Greek minority, not only during the riots but, as we shall see, in the sporadic violence against Greeks that broke out even before the pogrom. Furthermore, his circular and its effects were tied to the violence of the local dp[Democratic Party] branch officers who were also officers of the ktc's local branches. Finally, Bil transformed the general anxiety of a segment of Turkish Cypriots—and the general, non-specific information passed on to him by Fazıl Küçük and Faiz Kaymak—into a definitive, planned, general massacre of Turkish Cypriots by their Greek neighbors on August 28. There is no evidence whatsoever that such a massacre was ever planned, and it was certainly never attempted either by eoka[National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters] or the Greek Cypriot leaders at the time. Nevertheless, through the circular and in an article that was published in Hürriyet on August 18, Bil gave the rumor of the massacre its final form, which, as such, was passed off to the Turkish people as a whole. Only two days after receiving the copy of Küçük's letter, he wrote in his newspaper that: "One can say today that the Greeks of Cyprus are fully armed. As for the Turks, they do not have weapons even for display. In this manner there has arisen today a paradoxical situation in Cyprus. According to special information that has been transmitted to us from Cyprus, the Greeks of the island will organize a major demonstration on the twenty-eighth of the present month, and they will attack the Turks. From all this, the Greeks have also given a name to this day: They have named it "The day of the general massacre'. ..."[148] Accordingly, from August 18, by virtue of both the circular and the article in Hürriyet, the rumor of the massacre became an established "fact," and was now adopted by individuals and groups devoted to creating an atmosphere of hysterical chauvinism and passionate hatred of the Greek minority.

On the day Bil's article appeared, the ktc's Bandırma branch telephoned the offices of the newspaper Tercüman, which published the branch's decision to send 1,000 ktc members to defend Turkish Cypriots, all to go before August 28. One day later, on August 19, Hürriyet published the declaration of Hüsamettin Canöztürk (general director of the National Federation of Turkish Students) and of the president of the Union of Turkish Students, according to which, "The Greeks cannot proceed to general massacre in Cyprus because they would reflect carefully on the consequences of such an act."[149] On the twentieth of the same month, the journalist Doğan Can published an interview with Bil in Yeni Sabah in which the Greek minority of Istanbul was depicted as hostages who would have to pay for the purported massacre of Turkish Cypriots, specifically on August 28 or 30: "I asked the General President of the organization ktc to inform me as to what his own opinion is in regard to the decision which the Greeks of Cyprus have taken in connection with the twenty-eighth of August, in which they have announced that that day will be the day of the general massacre of the Turks. To this question, Hikmet Bil gave me the following answer: 'The answer to such a question is the following: In Istanbul, there are many Greeks.'"[150] On August 20, Tercüman published a second news item from Bandırma, according to which Menderes himself had replied to the local ktc office's offer to send 1,000 volunteers to defend Turkish Cypriots: "I esteem your patriotic sentiments. At the same time that I express to you my respect, please remain certain that the Government is ever alert and that it shall not hesitate to take the required measures."[151] The following day, Yeni Sabah published a second statement by Faiz Kaymak: "The innocent and unarmed Turks fear that at any moment they will be massacred by the terrorists. We desire that Turkey provide every aid and that it ensure the lives and the property of the Turks of Cyprus."[152]

The Turkish government, aware of the sources of this rumor-become-"fact," did nothing to squelch it. On the contrary, the government validated it by giving it credence and, ultimately, used it to justify its new Cyprus policy. Given the fact that Menderes's liaison with the ktc was his close confidant, Ahmet Emin Yalman (who was on the ktc's governing board); that Bil and his organization had been handpicked by Menderes himself as the man and group to arouse Turkish national passions; and that, finally, the organization itself was financed by the government, it is clear that Menderes knew well what the organization was about in spreading such rumors, first covertly, and then openly through the Turkish press. Finally, such a rumor-become-fact would please both Eden and Macmillan at the London conference, during which time the pogrom had been calculated to erupt.[153]

On August 24, Prime Minister Menderes held a banquet at the Liman Lokantası (Harbor Restaurant) in honor of Foreign Minister Zorlu and of the members of his mission who were to depart for London to represent Turkey at the tripartite conference. Among the guests were various other ministers, members of parliament, businessmen, and newspaper editors.[154] Menderes would seize the occasion to make a strong public statement on Turkeys new policy on Cyprus. The process of transforming his previous, more circumspect policy vis-a-vis Greek claims in Cyprus and the issue of self-determination had ended as a result of the Turkish response to the British prodding of the preceding year. The intensified encouragement and support, often covert, of student and political organizations now gave way to a trumpeting of Turkeys overriding interest in Cyprus because of the former's "historical rights" in the matter and because the Turkish minority was supposedly threatened by massacre. The timing was excellent, as the new Turkish team of foreign-ministry specialists and officials were preparing for the trip to the London conference after having prepared and published the White Book that set forth Turkey's claims, indeed demands, which not only startled the Greek side, but made the British apprehensive at the Pandora's Box-like results that they had provoked, with a number of Foreign Office staff unsure as to what they had unleashed exactly. The Greek scholar, Neokles Sarres, has described the Turkish appearance at the conference as the "Turkish Premiere." The time and place were appropriate for Menderes's speech to the assembled banqueters. The speech formally announced Turkey's new policy and outlined the demands to be made in London. It also included the timeworn cliches about his opposition to Cypriot self-determination, the plight of Turks in Greek Thrace, the war between Greeks and Turks in Asia Minor, the old (and long-settled) "Cretan Question," and related subjects of random relevance. He gave his sharpest attention and force to Cyprus, however, still building on Bil's fabrications:

I wish to observe that our recently published diplomatic note to the British Government does not constitute the full and complete content of the actual importance and significance of this diplomatic note. In this diplomatic note, we expressed the malaise which we feel over the danger to which our fellow Turks in Cyprus are exposed.

The stance that the terrorists have taken on the question of Cyprus, and all that which is being said in regard to our subject, have plunged us into justified uneasiness. This malaise refers in part certainly also to the future. Among all these things, the major source of our malaise is constituted by all those things that are reported, somber events that will unfold in Cyprus from one day to another. We do not wish to consider these things certain, nor are we able to accept that it is possible that the matter may take such a turn. Nevertheless, those men announce uninterruptedly, with a terrorist air, that August 28 shall be a day of general massacre of our fellow Turks in Cyprus. We are certain that the British Government, based upon its legal rights, shall carry out its obligations thoroughly. It is said that the excitation of the Greek population of the island...has reached a peak. Consequently, a sudden undertaking, a criminal initiative devoid of all conscience, could provoke results of which the consequences would be inescapable and incurable. ... The local officials, it is possible, will be unprepared for this. And our population there will probably be found to be unarmed and unable to move against a majority which is extremely excited and armed. This does not mean, however, that these people, I mean the Turks, will remain, not even for a moment, undefended.[155]

This speech combined many of the weapons of political complaint from the traditional Turkish armory of diplomatic war on Greece. Nevertheless, it was based primarily on the fabricated Greek Cypriot plan to massacre Turkish Cypriots, combined with a new diplomatic offensive to wrest the previously existing advantage from the Greek side and transfer it to the Turkish side. This offensive would ultimately lead to the split of the Demokrat Parti, the pogrom of September 6-7, 1955, the destruction of the Greek community of Istanbul, and the poisoning of all hopes for some kind of rational and peaceful accommodation of two neighbors fated to live side by side. For Turkey and its people, the speech was the opening salvo in the dictatorialization of Menderes's government; it also led to the decades-long presence and interference of the military caste in Turkish society, politics, culture, education, and the economy that was inaugurated by the overthrow of Menderes's government by the military coup of May 27, 1960. For Menderes was to be destroyed in the end by his very success in subverting the structure of democratic government through the party structure of the Demokrat Parti, which, at the same time, was increasingly subjected to his personal authority.

137. Theodoropoulos, Semeioma, p. 3; Armaoğlu, Kıbrıs meselesi, p. 124; Robert Holland, Britain and the revolt of Cyprus, 1954-1959, Oxford, 1998, passim, especially Chapter 3, pp. 55-82; and Francois Crouzer, Le conflit de Chypre, 1946-1959, Brussels, 1973, Volume II, pp. 688-690.

138. Chrestides, Ekthesis, pp. 120-121.

Theodoropoulos, Semeioma, p. 3. See note 131 above.

141. For a detailed account, see Sarres, E alle pleura, Volume II Part I, pp. 51-71; Dikerdem, Ortadoğuda devrim, pp. 121-159, especially p. 125. Sarres, pp. 81-83, gives a detailed exposition of the new Turkish position on Cyprus as presented in London and in the Turkish White Book. Also, Armaoğlu, Kıbrıs meselesi, pp. 27-28; Burçak, Yassıada ve öncesi, pp. 124-125, like many other observers who wanted a more aggressive Turkish policy on Cyprus, warmly welcomed the replacement of Köprülü with Zorlu as foreign minister, and his evaluation of the two men represents the thought of all those who wanted Cyprus for Turkey. Whether Zorlu's "abilities" served his country well in the end or not remains in question.

142. Palaiologos, Diagramma, pp. 20-22, gives a representative sampling of the specific issues and tone of the Turkish press; for other references, see footnote 137 above.

143. Theodoropoulos, Semeioma, pp. 4-5.

144. Such was the opinion also of Nüsret Kirişçioğlu, Yassıada Kumandanına cevap, p. 149: "Köprülü, a man with no clear idea, was an incompetent minister. ...We almost lost Cyprus because of him. Finally, the late Fatin Rüştü Zorlu was elected to the Assembly and we were saved. ...We were saved but the blessed Fatin Rüştü Zorlu was not able to save his neck from the hands of the clever Fuat Köprülü. ..."

145. Sarres, E alle pleura, Volume II, Part I, passim.

146. National Archives, Dispatch No. 306, American Consul General of Istanbul to the Department of State, February 20, 1956. The memorandum is discussed in Armaoğlu, Kıbrıs meselesi, pp. 127-130. Dosdoğru, 6/7 Eylül olayarı, p. 220, quotes the text from the third trial at Yassıada. It is interesting that Chrestides, Ekthesis, pp. 152-153, translates from the Turkish newspaper Tercüman, August 19, 1955, a message by Faiz Kaymak in Ankara stating that the Turks of Cyprus are being threatened with destruction and asking for assistance from Turkey.

147. National Archives, Dispatch No. 306, American Consul General of Istanbul to the Department of State, February 20, 1956.

148. Chrestides, Ekthesis, p. 153 149 Ibid., p. 154.

150. Ibid., p. 155.

151. Ibid., p. 155. 

152. Ibid.,p. 156.

153. Sarres, E aile pleura, Volume II, Part I, pp. 74-77, gives a brief survey of the virulence of the Turkish press.

154. Sarres, Ibid., has an informative account of the meeting as well as of the perception of the coming London gathering from the pen of a more junior member of the diplomatic mission, Mahmut Dikerdem, as presented in the latter's memoirs, Ortadoğuda devrim, pp. 121-159.

155. Chrestides, Ekthesis, pp. 157-158, where it is translated into Greek.

Source:

Vryonis, Speros. The Mechanism of Catastrophe: The Turkish Pogrom Of September 6-7, 1955, And The Destruction Of The Greek Community Of Istanbul. Greekworks.com (New York, 2005). p. 80-88.

Turkey, the bandit state

The Turkish human rights activist, lawyer and journalist, Orhan Kemal Cengiz, gave perhaps the best description of the nature of the Turkish state and its ties to criminality and use of criminal acts to pursue its domestic and foreign policy:

Zaman: Getting rid of a bandit state / 03 January 2012

The state has committed grave crimes in Turkey; in every case, it has also managed to involve society in these crimes. In order to achieve this, it has sometimes jointly committed these offenses, taking measures to ensure that the collaborators have benefited from the outcomes of the criminal acts. For instance, the offenses committed against non-Muslims in Turkey follow this pattern. Some groups have become rich by their crimes in Turkey.

Another way the state involves society while committing these crimes is by ensuring that the people who talk about them feel guilty. One is given the impression that it would be a betrayal to the country to discuss state crimes.

We should note that former Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz said that the forest fires in Greece were plotted by the Turkish state. This statement raised fury in Greece but it is not discussed in Turkey -- why? It is because we feel guilty. If we discuss this issue thoroughly, Turkey may face hardships and have to pay compensation. Besides, the fires were committed as a form of retaliation.

The argument is that we punished Greece because they hosted PKK militants in their camps. However, Greece hosted these militants because of other crimes that Turkey had committed previously. Torture and mistreatment was widespread in Turkey in the 1990s. Villages were evacuated and burned down and people were abducted and executed. For this reason Turkey's requests for the extradition of the PKK militants were rejected by European states. And Greece, without fearing of international reaction or condemnation, was able to extend support to the PKK.

In an attempt to address its poor human rights record, Turkey set fire to Greek forests. Now we are expected to ignore this fact just because it is possible that our country may be hurt.

Is it not also the case with the Armenian issue? Do they not imply that Turkey would have to pay compensation and reparations if we thoroughly discuss the past? ...

I personally believe that the cost of getting rid of the bandit state and creating a state governed by the rule of law is immeasurable. If we have to pay a big price on the road to becoming a state governed by the rule of law, I claim that we should pay that price. ... If Turkey is ready to pay reparations, I am also ready to pay extra taxes to replace the money made by those who became rich when non-Muslim properties were looted.

...

March 29, 2017 update:  Zaman's internet presence has been silenced the totalitarian Turkish government after a March 4. 2016 raid and seizure, so I changed the link to an archive.org capture. Further on on July 2016, Ankara tyrants finally shut down Zaman and more than 100 other media outlets.

How Western oriented was Turkey ever?

Turkey and the United States are experiencing a rift, especially as regards how to respond to the civil war in Syria(or should we say terrorism as the Turkish side does in regards to Kurds?). Back in June 2012 when the Turkish F-4 (RF-4ETM) was shot down, Ankara claimed it did not violate Syrian airspace. However un-named American defense and intelligence officials cited in a Wall Street Journal report denied the initial Turkish version of events, which the Turks hoped to would have initiated a Libya style air campaign under article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Now the rifts over their competing Syria policies grow even more, as Hurriyet reports today, the Turkish undersecretary of foreign affairs, Feridun Sinirlioğlu "criticized Washington’s decision to declare the al-Nusra front in Syria a terror organization." Some still attribute this rift to an aberration isolated only to the AKP regime and its fervent supporters, however according to think-tank scholar, Michael Rubin, even back in 2010 the allegedly contrarian military had the same views:

The lower ranks of the Turkish military share the same virulent hostility toward the United States and the conspiratorial anti-Semitism of men like President Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan. I sat through the Turkish General Staff’s (TGS) academic conference a couple years ago and heard lecturer after lecturer — each chosen by the TGS’s think tank — accusing the United States and Israel of the most base conspiracies. While traditional to fly the flag of every country whose diplomats were attending the conference, the TGS decided that Israel’s flag alone would not be flown.

If we go back further in time, one can even question more what kind of Western ally was Turkey ever, besides a fair weather one.

Balkan Analysis: Adventures with the CIA in Turkey: Interview with Philip Giraldi

July 30, 2006 In the following exclusive interview, Balkanalysis.com Director Christopher Deliso speaks with Philip Giraldi, a former CIA deputy chief of base in Turkey. ...

Christopher Deliso: First of all, please share some background information about your mission. What exactly was your position in Turkey? For how long were you stationed there?
Philip Giraldi: I served as deputy chief of base of Istanbul from 1986 to 1989. In the CIA, a station is in the capital city, Ankara, in this case, and is subordinate to the Embassy. All other field elements in any given country are called bases.
...
CD: Why? Was spying on the Turks out of the question, or too difficult or what?PG: The CIA did not make much of an effort to develop good sources among Turks because it was extremely perilous to do so, both in terms of US broader equities and because the Turks were very aggressive in a counter-intelligence sense....
CD: So there was no formal or tacit agreement between the two governments to not spy on one another, being NATO allies and so on?
PG: There was no agreement between the US and Turkey that we would not spy on each other- I believe that only Britain enjoys that status. Indeed, the Turks did spy very actively on our diplomatic missions, mostly through co-opting the local employees who worked there.

Life under Surveillance

CD: So combining this with your statement that “the Turks were very aggressive in a counter-intelligence sense”- how did this affect you and your colleagues?
PG: Embassy officers who were known or suspected to be CIA were surveilled whenever they went out, had their phones tapped, and their apartments were bugged.My apartment had microphones in the table lamps, for example, and everything I said on the phone was taped and analyzed. I was routinely surveilled when I went out to lunch, sometimes by teams of as many as one dozen survellants using cars and radios.

CD: That sounds stressful. How did you handle yourself, under the circumstances?
PG: When your apartment is bugged as mine was, you just talk normally and never ever talk about work.
CD: Would it have been foolhardy to remove those devices?
PG: If you remove the microphones, they would just put more in- in the end, it’s better to know where they are than to have to guess.
CD: Did you ever try to deceive them by speaking nonsense, or code, or things that would send them on a wild goose chase?
PG: No- you don’t play games with them, because then they really get mad and come after you with everything. And you don’t want that.
...
The Future of US-Turkey Covert Relations

CD: Many observers, and most pointedly the neocons, have declared that there has been a breakdown in relations with Turkey since the invasion of Iraq and the Turkish refusal of a northern attack route for the US. How bad are things really?
PG: I certainly know that the relationship is regarded as cool and that the Turks are extremely mistrustful of the United States, primarily due to our failure to suppress PKK activity in northern Iraq. The neocons, of course, would like to see Turkey join in a new crusade against Syria and Iran, but that is not about to happen.
CD: So has the CIA’s intelligence-sharing cooperation with Turkey also suffered because of this chill?
PG: Intelligence cooperation with Turkey has always been so-so. They share information only when it is completely in their interest to do so, not otherwise.
CD: So is Turkey now being categorized at the policy-making level as more of a hostile power than a friend? If so, Will the US be able to win back Turkish trust?
PG: Turks really dislike the US because of the mess in Iraq and the impending mess that our unquestioning support of Israel means for the region. And the Turkish government has reflected that antipathy. If you want to change the perception, you have to change the policy. Not likely to happen, is it?
...
CD: What can you say about how the current Israeli war in Lebanon will affect the traditional Israeli-Turkish alliance?
PG: Well, concerning the impact of [what is happening now in] Lebanon, you must be aware of the fact that the so-called “friendly” relationship between the two countries is very narrowly focused. It is largely the Turkish Army’s General Staff that keeps the relationship going, because it provides access to US military assistance and weapons that would otherwise be embargoed.
The Turkish public and the government, on the other hand, are rather ambivalent, if not hostile, to the relationship. And they are now very angry about the attacks on fellow Muslims in Lebanon.
...